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Financialization and the third sector: Innovation in social housing bond markets 
 
Abstract 
The recent global financial crisis (GFC) has seen investors turn away from 
real-estate bonds, given their role in distributing risk during the crisis. 
However, since 2009, a new type of real-estate bond market has grown in 
London, enabling social housing groups to issue bonds. This could be viewed 
as further evidence of the extension of financialization practices into new 
spaces, beyond those of traditional capital markets and associated 
intermediaries. In this paper, we examine how financialization has begun to 
permeate the third sector, reordering the priority of housing associations’ 
values, displacing social value creation with the economic. We highlight how 
reduced state funding has led social housing providers to become more 
reliant on capital market intermediaries, and explore how locally orientated 
social housing associations have become embedded within wider financial 
networks. While policy makers have viewed financial markets as a panacea 
to fund social housing developments in an age of austerity, tensions have 
emerged, requiring localised social housing organisations to become more 
commercial in their activities, jeopardising their ability to protect vulnerable 
communities through social value creation. 
 
1. Introduction  
By 2008 the US subprime crash had spread to create a global financial crisis (GFC). In contrast 
to previous crises, the GFC was unique in that it permeated a diverse range of spaces, from 
global financial markets to households, destabilising financial institutions and tipping debt 
laden governments into fiscal crises. One distinctive feature of the GFC is rooted in financial 
engineering, where mortgages were restructured to ‘remove’ risk through a process known as 
securitization, which enabled mortgage income to be sold to institutional investors as bonds 
(Marshall et al. 2011). This practice led to the adoption of financialization processes within 
residential real-estate, connecting regional mortgages lenders and capital markets, creating 
risk conduits that would connect global financial centres, governments, households and 
consumers more closely together, facilitating a wider contagion of the crisis. 
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Investor appetite for securitised real-estate bonds declined markedly after the GFC 
(Wainwright 2015), although a new securitization market in the US has recently emerged, 
bundling single household rental receivables (Fields 2017). In the UK, a new residential bond 
market also began to grow rapidly: housing association bonds. Subsequently, while UK real-
estate through securitization has declined, practices of financialization have been adapted 
within third sector real-estate. Housing Associations (HAs) have a charitable status and provide 
reduced cost rental housing for vulnerable or low income households. They received 
government funding for development, but since the Thatcherite governments of the 1980s, 
funding was reduced (cf. Aalbers et al. 2015), leading them to obtain commercial loans to meet 
shortfalls. However, post-GFC austerity accelerated government cuts, while regulation has 
reduced the availability of long-term bank loans for HAs, forcing them to turn to global capital 
markets.  
Global pension and insurance funds began purchasing regionally embedded HA bonds, 
effectively privatizing HA development funding. However, established practices of real estate 
financialization in the context of HAs is not clear cut. While many for-profit organisations 
experience negative outcomes from financialization (Pike 2006), many HAs have a non-profit 
status, with social aims to house vulnerable and low income tenants, and to support local 
communities. It can be argued that these core objectives are diametrically opposed to the 
politics of financialization. Subsequently, this study seeks to examine how the demand to 
support investor returns has begun to initiate spatial and organisational change in the third 
sector. 
This paper has 3 aims: First, it seeks to contribute to research on financialization, by 
investigating third sector finance innovation in HAs. The paper will examine how localised 
spaces of HAs have become connected to global capital markets and investors through London. 
Second, we explore the tensions between financialization’s return seeking politics, and the 
charitable missions of HAs, in addition to the risks that can emerge through the development 
of bond programmes. Third, the paper seeks to uncover how these contradictory politics can 
be potentially managed, while examining how these challenges are inherently spatial. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 examines recent research on 
financialization, concerning real-estate markets, the public and third sector. This review is used 
to frame the paper’s analysis. The section will also outline the research design, from which the 
findings are drawn. Section 3 will investigate the emergence of the new bond market which 
provides HAs with access to investor capital. In this section, we explore how the bond market 
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grew after the GFC, connecting local HAs to global investors through London, unravelling the 
geographies of production and the effect of space in designing bonds. Section 4 analyses the 
tensions between the politics of the third sector and financialization, while exploring new 
innovations that attempt to manage these issues. The final section concludes the paper.  
2. Financialization:  new markets and spaces 
2.1. Private sector: From equity markets to housing markets 
Prior to the GFC, financialization was increasingly successful in reshaping everyday life (cf. 
Martin 2002), across individual (Langley 2007), household (Finlayson 2009) corporate (Pike 
2006; Muellerleile 2006), regional, national and global spaces (Wainwright 2012; French et al. 
2011; Krippner 2005), connecting new actors to global circuits of capital (Krippner 2005). Since 
the GFC, researchers have turned to examine real estate through the lens of financialization, 
but this has become an increasingly complex task, due to the proliferation of its contested 
definitions (Engelen 2008; Christophers 2015; Aalbers 2016). French et al. (2009) suggest that 
there are two particular framings of financialization. First, it is a term that describes the 
growing power of finance over the economy and society. Second, it can be viewed as a 
conceptual tool to focus on the processes and role of technologies, metrics and values of 
financialization in shaping change across space. Even within the second, more critical approach, 
there are variations as to how financialization is viewed. For example, it can be viewed as the 
increasing role of financial motives in markets actors and institutions (Epstein 2005), or the 
increased power and dominance of financial actors markets and narratives, resulting in the 
reorganisation of firms, households and states (Aalbers 2015). In positioning our paper within 
these debates, we seek to drawn upon French et al’s. (2009) second identified sphere, utilising 
a softer sectorial case study approach, following other recent studies (Langley 2007; Leyshon 
and French 2009; Wainwright 2012; Froud et al. 2006). This will enable us to focus on the 
actors involved in HA bond markets, while providing critical insight into the power and 
processes of financialization that reshape the organizations and spaces of the third sector. 
This is important, as earlier studies focussed on how financialization’s politics were activated 
through shareholder value metrics and the disciplining of executive management through 
voting rights (Froud et al. 2000; Pike 2006). In short, executive remuneration and job security 
is contingent on their ability to increase value, through stock prices and dividends. While 
research on the financialization of real-estate has grown considerably (Aalbers and 
Christophers 2014; Aalbers 2016), studies have not been sufficiently critical in highlighting how 
financialization functions in the context of bond markets, despite studies of securitization. 
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Equity value can be enhanced by increasing dividends and share prices (Froud et al. 2000; 
Wainwright 2012; Muellerleile 2009), but real-estate bonds, such as medium term notes 
(MTNs) or residential mortgage backed studies (RMBS) tend to offer a fixed, or floating return, 
where the latter is based on interbank rates, not asset performance. Subsequently, bond 
investors cannot engage in corporate governance to shape organisational behaviour and 
performance through voting rights, they can only receive bond income, making them passive 
in contrast to equity investors. Arguably, a more nuanced approach is required to understand 
the processes of financialization in real-estate markets. 
We suggest that real-estate financialization can be viewed through an alternative ‘bond-based’ 
approach. As highlighted earlier, bond holders cannot influence the corporate governance of 
real estate landlords as they do not have shareholder voting rights. However, they are able to 
influence organisational behaviour in the event of a bond default, but also before bonds are 
issued. As will be discussed later, potential bondholders can become involved in the design of 
bonds; as they will only purchase the securities if bonds issuers (landlords ) follow certain rules 
and covenants which prescribe how they must behave (Cook et al. 2014). To achieve this, new 
metrics and framings are developed (Froud et al. 2000), and changes can be made to issuer’s 
operational and business plans, which an issuer’s management must not deviate from, 
otherwise they risk triggering a default. Consequently, the power of institutional investors 
triggers organisational change through the formalization of risk management plans, prior to 
bond issuance, implemented through frozen discourses that discipline the bond issuer into 
maintaining a particular set of behaviours (Miller and Rose 2008; Beunza and Garud 2007; 
Bowker and Star 1999). In this alternative approach, processes of financialization occur before 
bonds are issued, where fixed boundaries constrain the issuer’s future behaviour over time. 
This approach can be used to provide critical insight into how organisations without 
shareholders, become entangled within the politics of financialization, providing further 
insight to address the dearth of study into how residential real-estate is integrated within the 
political economy (Aalbers and Christophers 2015).  
 
2.2. Third sector: From public to social finance 
While further research is required to understand the mechanisms behind real-estate 
financialization, an additional area yet to be thoroughly examined is how the politics of finance 
have begun to reshape the third sector.  Scholars have begun to investigate a roll-back of the 
state, through public finance initiatives (Froud and Shaoul 2001; Froud 2003; Strickland 2013) 
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and the direct privatization of public utilities (Aalbers at al. 2015; Ashton et al. 2014; Acerete, 
et al. 2011; O’Neill 2013), but insight into the growing role of financial services in the third 
sector are largely absent from studies of financialization and the third sector (Lehner and 
Nicholls 2014; Moore et al. 2012). The increased role of financial markets in HA activities post-
GFC can be viewed as part of a wider narrative of third sector financialization which gained 
momentum in the early 2000s, as new social finance innovations were introduced within the 
UK.  
 
In 2000, the Social Investment Taskforce (SITF) was created by the government to cultivate 
new social finance markets, with the aim of reducing charity and social enterprise grant 
dependency (Nicholls 2010). The third sector consists of organisations that have primarily 
charitable and social aims, and can take the legal form of: industrial and provident societies, 
mutuals, community interest companies and charities, for example. In contrast to the politics 
of financialization, economic returns are secondary to their charitable aims, which prioritise 
social value creation (Emerson and Twersky 1996; Nicholls 2008). The SITF was part of a 
broader attempt of the New Labour government to mainstream the third sector, making 
organisations independent and sustainable, with capacity for growth while reducing 
government funding (Alcock 2010; Lyon and Baldock 2014). Although new social finance 
models have grown successfully in developing economies, innovations in UK social finance 
were initially slow to progress (Lehner and Nicholls 2014), with markets criticised for being  
inefficient, fragmented and poorly defined, with a limited ecology of financing institutions and 
intermediaries to connect the third sector to finance (Lehner and Nicholls 2014; Glänzel and 
Schuerle 2015). 
 
Following the activities of the SITF, a new Charity Bank (2002), Phoenix fund (2003) and Social 
Finance Limited (2007) investment bank were established, to provide funding and social 
venture capital to the sector (Social Investment Taskforce 2010). Social finance innovations 
included social equity and debt markets, social impact bonds, and an EU Social Impact 
Accelerator to bring funding to the third sector (Glänzel and Schuerle 2015), and the creation 
of community development finance institutions, to assist in local regeneration and third sector 
support (Affleck and Mellor 2006). In addition to this, conventional banks have extended their 
lending provision to the third sector (Lyon and Baldock 2014). 
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Demand for social finance comes predominantly from larger, asset intensive social enterprises, 
such as HAs, with smaller organisations preferring to undertake bricolage funding through 
informal sources, or operating capital (Sunley and Pinch 2012; Lyon and Baldock 2014). 
Scholars have indicated how the ecosystem’s actors experience conflicting institutional logics 
over the importance of the social value sought by the third sector, and economic returns 
demanded by investors (Glänzel and Schuerle 2015). Reconciling these differences has been 
fraught with difficulty, as third sector organisations often lack business experience, skills and 
the financial planning capabilities to reassure investors (Glänzel and Schuerle 2015). This is 
compounded by differences in the communication, language, terminology and attitudes 
(Pache and Santis 2013) of investors and third sector (Lehner and Nicholls 2014), and the 
complexity of some transactions. Arguably, the HA sector has experienced these problems, 
but its bond market is unique in that its broadly recognised by mainstream pension and 
insurance investors, and unlike the majority of the third sector, requires substantial volumes 
of capital, making it a distinct and established market. However, consistent with findings from 
broader social finance research, the HA bond market’s recent growth within the sector is 
relatively new, creating tensions between social and economic priorities, but also in that the 
HA bond market’s boundaries are still being defined by different stakeholders. As such, new 
rules, standards and terminologies (cf. Pache and Santis 2013) being unveiled by financial 
professions, who are seeking to determine ‘the rules of the game’, but which conflict with the 
organisational culture and objectives of HAs. 
 
A nascent HA bond market began in 1988, when the Housing Finance Corporation (THFC) was 
established, predating attempts to create a broader social finance market in the UK, although 
the use of capital markets and bond issuance did not grow substantially until the late 2000s, 
as governments reduced funding (Lennartz 2011; Rolnik 2013; THFC 2016) (Table 1). This has 
seen the widespread adoption of performance management metrics and market-orientated 
narratives, where HAs have begun to displace social and regulatory frameworks with a private 
sector agenda, focussing on ‘asset management’, valuations and risk modelling (Gruis 2002; 
Kok and Driessen 2012; Manville and Broad 2013) making the sector more compatible with 
financialization, as seen in the nascent social impact bond market. In this sense, HAs are not 
reshaping the practices of financialization, but are reshaping their activities to become 
compatible with existing real estate valuation and risk metrics used in the private sector. 
Subsequently, further research into the HA sector can contribute to providing further 
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understandings into how the third sector had become entangled capital market intermediaries 
and investors.  
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
The politics and processes of financialization contradict the social purposes of HAs and it is 
unclear if meeting social objectives is ranked ahead of financial returns for investors (Froud et 
al. 2002; Finlayson 2009). The negative impacts of financial risks and objectives can undermine 
housing provision and support for vulnerable or low income tenants (Malpass 2000). For 
example, Netherlands-based HA Vestia nearly collapsed in 2011, following extensive financial 
speculation, inadequate supervision and poor understanding of financial products (Aalbers et 
al.  2015), while the UK, the Cosmopolitan HA required an emergency merger to avoid collapse 
due to strategic overextension funded by bond markets (Altair 2014). These social objectives 
run contrary to those of investors raising questions as to how these competing sets of politics 
may affect HAs, in addition to the spatial implications, in connecting them to global financial 
markets.  
 
2.3 Research design 
This paper primarily uses semi-structured interviews, with secondary sources to contextualise 
the data within a wider context. The empirical data was collected between 2013 and 2015 and 
consists of 30 interviews. The interviewees consist of directors, associates, analysts and 
managers from investment banks, commercial banks, boutique finance houses, policy-makers, 
industry representatives, investors and HAs, large and small, in addition to management 
consultants. These respondents work within the UK HA bond market sector in issuing; placing 
and consuming bonds. Participants were identified through systematic searches of the 
Internet. For example, reports published by the Homes and Communities Agency (HCA) 
provided information on HAs. Further searches revealed HA size by turnover and housing unit 
portfolio, whose websites offered insight into their use of capital markets through available 
bond prospectus documentation. As the HA bond market is serviced by a small number of 
financial institutions, snowballing was used to gain access, in addition to searches of financial 
institutions’ websites, to reveal which financial firms are active in the market. This was 
supplemented by bond fund prospectus and financial sector press searches, to identify 
investors (e.g. Financial Times and Social Housing). Participant names were then located 
through corporate websites and reports.  
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The interviews were semi-structured to provide participants with flexibility and to 
accommodate their experiences and expertise. The questions sought to examine the history 
and formation of the bond market, but also post-GFC growth, in addition to how innovations 
occurred and how new stakeholders entered the market. The questions also examined the 
strategies, practices and difficulties that emerge in reconciling the different politics of various 
stakeholders. The duration of the interviews ranged between 45 minutes at 2 hours. Each 
interview was digitally recorded and transcribed. The transcripts were then thematically coded, 
prior to their analysis. The analysis was also supported by materials and documents suggested 
by interviewees, including bond documentation and market reports for further triangulation.  
 
3. HAs and financialization  
In 1979, the Conservative government began the privatisation of public housing (Crook 1986), 
formalised in the 1980 Housing Act. This was the beginning of a series of important changes 
for the HA sector (See Table 1 for a summary of events). The ‘Big Bang’ in 1986 assisted 
privatisation, as newly liberalised financial institutions were able to finance housing. These 
changes transformed Britain’s political economy of housing (cf. Aalbers and Christophers 
2014). Financial liberalization lifted restrictions on mortgage provision, increasing competition 
and availability, extending homeownership to households who would have previously been 
denied credit (Wainwright 2012; Malpass 2000). New finance products funded the transfer of 
state owned assets to individuals, through a series of new schemes, including the ‘right to buy’ 
initiative which provided substantial subsidies to tenants to help them buy their home from 
the council. In addition, HAs and local councils were able to develop shared equity/ownership 
schemes, to assist households in buying a share of ownership in their rented home, with the 
aim of creating a property owning democracy (Crook 1986). However, despite property 
subsidies and access to new finance products, many low income households were unable to 
afford their own home and were reliant on the rental market (Malpass 2000). 
 
A second wave of privatization provided HAs with a more significant role in the political 
economy’s housing provision (cf. Aalbers 2016). This would radically change the structure, 
geographies and funding of HAs. The history of HAs is rooted in the 19th century, when they 
were established by wealthy Victorian philanthropists and religious organisations (see Emsley 
1986 and Tickell 1996). Initially, they provided quality housing for the working classes, were 
small in scale and supported local communities. In the 1990s they began to grow rapidly in 
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scale as the government began to transfer council housing stock into HA ownership (Malpass 
2000). This phase also witnessed mergers of smaller HAs throughout the 1990s and 2000s to 
provide them with economies of scale and operational efficiencies (Malpass 2000), which 
began to dilute the community–based identity of some providers. By 2016, housing providers 
continued to be an important component of UK housing provision with 1774 registered social 
housing groups, managing over 2,647,000 housing units (HCA 2016).  
 
Consistent with the roll-back of the state and introduction of private finance initiatives (Froud 
and Shaoul, Froud 2003; Strickland 2013; Ashton, et al. 2014), the government began to view 
the HA sector as a strategic partner that could increase ‘public’ housing provision with limited 
state involvement. Simultaneously, the government sought to reduce the proportion of HA 
capital development funding per project, with the expectation that HAs could use their 
substantial assets as security to access private capital from financial markets. This has also 
been met by additional policy changes that have reduced HA funding, particularly for rental 
income. For example, the Welfare Reform Act (2012) stimulated the introduction of what 
became popularly known as ‘Bedroom Tax’ and Universal Credit (Manville et al. 2016). The 
Bedroom Tax reduced housing benefits if tenants had unoccupied rooms, reducing benefits 
and increasing the chance of arrears. This is particularly problematic for tenants in areas where 
there is an abundance of larger properties, with fewer smaller properties to move to, but also 
for HAs as some tenants may leave, reducing their rental income. The Universal Credit plan, 
seeks to cap benefits at £25,000 per household, reducing available benefits to tenants, but 
also transferring the payment to them directly (Manville et al. 2016). Tenants with low 
financial literacy and a reduced income may be more likely to struggle to manage their 
payments, increasing the risk of arrears, and reducing income certainty for HAs. In an attempt 
to diversify and manage risks, some HAs have begun to develop student housing, private rental 
properties, private properties for sale, and shared equity schemes (HCA 2011; Bramley 1994). 
One critique however, is that these projects have sometimes been poorly timed or executed, 
generating loses for HAs, as they work to diversify income in an environment with reduced 
government grants and welfare income (Altair 2014). 
 
As will be discussed in the next section, HAs accessed commercial loans from high street banks 
in the 1990s to support developments, rather than use bond funding, but since the GFC, they 
have turned to capital markets. Sector debt increased from £28.3Bn to £63.4Bn between 2006-
2015 (Figure 1). During this time there has been a corresponding fall in HA capital grants. 
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Although capital funding increased in absolute terms from £27.6Bn in 2006 to £42.5Bn in 2015 
(Table 2), it has declined as a percentage of total assets.  During the 1990s, capital grants 
covered 75% of construction costs, falling to 39% in 2010 and just 14% for the years 2011-2015 
(National Federation of ALMOs 2015:11). It is clear that HAs are turning to capital market 
funding to plug the gap left by the decrease in grant funding, and in turn are using this finance 
to grow their housing portfolios substantially, to provide additional housing units for social 
and private rents, adding 635,503 units between 2006 and 2015, a sector stock increase of 
31.6% (Table 2). Due to fragmented history of the market, accessing quantitative data on bond 
issuance is difficult. However, market data compiled by THFC (2016; 32) indicates in the years 
2010-11, capital market funding accounted for under £1bn, rising to £1.5bn in 2011-12 and 
£4.1bn in 2014-15. Table 3 provides information on recent transactions, including the growth 
in size of bond transactions, but also the recent decrease in yields, highlighting their popularity 
with investors and perceived low risk. 
 
[Figure 1; Table 2 and 3 around here] 
 
3.1 HA finance: back to the future? 
In the 1980s, the nascent HA bond market ecosystem comprised of new and existing capital 
market intermediaries (Folkman et al. 2007) and institutional investors (Clark and Monk 2014). 
The first, an organisation called THFC, was established in 1987 by the National Housing 
Federation, a representative body for HAs, and a regulatory body: The Housing Corporation.  
THFC was known as an aggregator platform that would issue bonds to institutional investors, 
and supply loans to participating HAs, with investor returns paid from rental income. THFC 
acted as a new capital market intermediary (Folkman et al. 2007), connecting HAs to 
institutional investors, facilitating financialization in a new sphere (French et al. 2011; Engelen 
et al, 2014), although this particular bond market was slow to develop. However, unlike the 
development of third sector financialization in the 2000s, assisted by the formation of funding 
institutions, the HA sector’s relationship with finance began much earlier. 
 
As with any new market, investors seek high yields due to uncertainty, while due diligence 
processes required them to check on the finances and business models of each participating 
HA – a cumbersome process. For HAs, international debt capital markets were unfamiliar, 
making the process less desirable, but it did not take long for competing financial institutions 
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to enter the market of HA finance. Following the ‘Big Bang’, London’s financial services sector 
had access to interbank money markets with low interest rates, which witnessed the entrance 
of high-street banks (Table 4) who began to recycle cash into 25-30 year long term loans:  
 
“And the interest fell away during the ‘90’s, then the banks started looking 
at this and saying “This looks a bit like a residential mortgage, and we 
understand that its property based, 25 year term finance” so the banks 
started piling in… So late ‘90’s/early 2000’s the banks are providing more 
finance into the sector” (R15 regulator) 
 
[Table 4 around here] 
 
High-street banks viewed HAs as a market straddling residential mortgages and commercial 
loans, and through incremental financial innovation and bricolage (Engelen et al. 2010) they 
came to dominate social housing finance. High-street banks were keen to enhance shareholder 
returns in a competitive, deregulated financial services market (Marshall et al 2011), although 
their mechanism of funding was unsustainable, facilitated by low LIBOR rates. In order to 
increase returns, banks began to sell interest rate swaps, derivatives and other services to 
capture profits from low cost loans, placing high-street banks with substantial exposures to HA 
real estate, which coincided with the GFC:  
 
“…banks were blatantly mis-pricing the loans they were making to the 
housing associations on the basis that however tight the pricing to Libor, 
they could then make significant additional amounts of money out of fixing 
derivatives on the loans, and other general services provided to housing 
associations…That left us with a position in 2007 where five banks in 
particular had around about, now I’m trying to think back here to find the 
specific figures, £45 – 47 billion of lending, the capital markets were by that 
stage a marginal provider” (R20 financial services) 
 
The GFC created considerable problems for high-street banks as LIBOR rates increased and 
liquidity evaporated. Capital adequacy regulation viewed long commercial loans unfavourably, 
especially when governments began to stress-test banks, so they became keen to get HAs to 
refinance their debt. In some cases, lenders searched loan contracts to look for breaches of 
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contract, to try and increase interest rates or force HA refinancing. As such, the collapse in 
liquidity from the GFC closed loan finance for HAs, which created a new funding gap: 
 
“The [funding] gap as far as the supported sector is concerned is huge.  But 
the huge funding requirement from the sector; they are looking at probably 
about continuing to raise £5 billion or so a year…And this fledgling market 
we are working on is only going to grow” (R22 financial services) 
 
Subsequently, HAs turned to capital market intermediaries (Table 4) to close the gap between 
state funding and demand for new housing, beginning the financialization of third sector assets 
(cf. Engelen et al.2014; Aalbers et al. 2015). Some larger HAs had already issued their own 
bonds directly to institutional markets in the 1990s. For example, L&Q issued a £130 million 
bond in 1998, providing investors with a semi-annual coupon of 7.93%, with BNP Paribas in 
London as the arranger.1 These ‘own label’ bonds, in addition to THFC bonds ensured that 
capital market intermediaries and investors retained knowledge of the nascent market, which 
enabled it to grow, following the GFC. While the market for residential securitization and 
property bonds had all but vanished in Europe (Wainwright 2015; Aalbers 2015) the niche HA 
bond market  began to develop rapidly, connecting socially-orientated HAs directly to capital 
markets, exposing HAs to new pressures and expectations (cf. Engelen et al. 2014; Marshall et 
al. 2011; Pike 2006). 
 
3.2 Placing local assets in global markets: geographies of production and spatial implications 
HA bond issues require the cultivation of new networks that connect local housing assets and 
revenue streams to a global investor base (cf. Marshall et al. 2011; Wainwright 2015). In order 
to access markets, smaller, or first time bond issuers, will often enrol the support of specialist 
consultants to calculate the costs of potential government welfare changes and tenant arrears 
on their business models, and the impact of bond repayment schedules to establish the most 
appropriate form of financing, whether it is to use an aggregator, private placement, ‘own label’ 
issue, or drawdown facility. Larger, experienced HAs will often complete this task themselves. 
The HA will then contact a specialist financial services provider, established high-street bank or 
investment bank that will arrange the financial transaction, the development of bond ratings 
                                                          
1 http://www.lqgroup.org.uk/services-for-residents/about-landq/performance-and-finance/investor-
relations/ 
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and legal documentation (See Table 2). The arranging banks will then work to establish pricing 
and investor demand, before HA executives begin to promote the deal. 
 
HA bonds are purchased by institutional investors, such as insurance and pension providers. 
(Clark and Monk 2015). While the bond yields are low, they are rated as having a low risk, since 
the revenue streams are heavily underpinned by housing benefit from the government (Table 
4). The 25-30 year long maturity of the bonds also matches the liabilities of annuity funds, 
which explains why many of the early purchasers were British insurers, located in London and 
Edinburgh. However, the market has recently attracted global investors as larger issues are 
listed on bond market indexes, which requires the managers of index tracking funds to acquire 
the bonds, attracting larger Canadian and US investors: 
 
 “When you reach £250 million of issuance on a bond, especially a rated 
bond, it goes on the index...then a number of other insurance companies 
have to buy it essentially, because they track these indices… all of a sudden 
the market opens up to a good 20/25 [investors], and you see Canadian 
pension funds coming in as well; they like the product; they understand 
property and the social consequences.  Who else buys this?  You’ll see some 
of the big funds nowadays as well, seriously coming over after the big deals 
from the States… this is actually a very attractive product as a Double A, 
Single A level, as most of these investors can’t buy below investment grade” 
(R21 financial services) 
 
While HA bonds are consumed globally, the underlying assets, revenue and risk are strongly 
influenced by local housing and labour markets, in addition to the wider economy. 
Subsequently, space is important to arranging banks and investors in determining the risk and 
pricing of bonds (Marshall et al. 2011; Wainwright 2012). Housing stock types and HA location 
can have a particular effect in determining risk profiles. For example, a recent change to 
welfare policy through the ‘Bedroom Tax’ has forced tenants on low incomes to lose part of 
their housing benefit for vacant rooms in their properties, increasing their risk of arrears: 
 
“There certainly is perhaps a divide in some areas of this in terms of north 
and south because it’s averse to the dreaded bedroom tax.  Well in the 
northern parts of the country there is quite a lot of under-occupation; 
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what’s been built over the last 40 years is mostly family homes…there could 
be under-occupation of one or two rooms, so people have been receiving 
benefits and they are having been asked to pay, and they will find it a 
struggle” (R22 financial services) 
 
The geographical risk inherent in local markets and the business models of HAs is also taken 
into account in valuing real-estate assets. Technically, in a bond default, housing assets could 
be repossessed by bondholders, although this scenario is considered unlikely, but provides 
reassurance to investors.2  Investors and arrangers indicated that in the past this has also 
affected the risk and pricing of bond purchases, with HAs located outside of London paying a 
comparatively higher bond yield as their housing, if repossessed, would fetch a lower price if 
sold to private developers (cf. Wainwright 2012).  
 
The location of HAs can also influence the complexity of their business models, which can also 
influence bondholder risk and pricing. Due to the higher operational and development costs of 
being based in London, HAs are often larger and more likely to be participate in more 
speculative activities such as building properties for private sale and rent, to cross-subside their 
social activities. While investors perceive greater security in London-based bonds, owing to 
high real-estate values, speculative operations can be viewed negatively, increasing funding 
costs, as highlighted below: 
 
“I think there still is, from the markets, a London/South East bias.  People 
are very comfortable with the valuations and demand characteristics in 
London, and you get more and more uncertain as you move further into the 
regions, Scotland being its own question… For the larger associations, we 
do get control with them.  I think greater exposure too.  And again, 
particularly in London with the other additional things they might do that 
the markets dislike, have been with their shared ownership” (R25 asset 
manager) 
 
                                                          
2 There have been limited failures of housing associations. Following the example of the Cosmopolitan 
Housing Association (see Altair 2014), it is likely the government would attempt to find another housing 
association, or a group of associations, to take control of the property and manage the assets and 
tenants. This would protect both investors and tenants. Due to political risks, it is unlikely that the 
government, or an investor, would seek to evict social housing tenants, although in an extreme scenario, 
this would be legally possible. 
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Paradoxically, diversification to cross-subside social housing, while creating social value by 
participating in shared ownership, can be viewed negatively by investors and arrangers, as this 
introduces more risk by moving away from stable revenue streams provided by social welfare 
benefits, which is perceived to be low risk.  
 
4. Managing contradictory private-public politics across local and global space 
As discussed earlier, one shortcoming of research on financialization is the limited insight into 
how non-equity investors can influence organisations. In the context of the third sector, bond 
investors do not have the voting rights enjoyed by shareholders (Froud et al 2000; Pike 2006; 
Muellerleile 2009). However, the implementation of bond covenants calculative frames and 
performance metrics by capital intermediaries (Froud et al. 2006; Miller and Rose 2008; 
Beunza and Garud 2007) enable them to shape business plans, to limit future drastic changes 
to their operations. It must be emphasized that this power is soft, as investors cannot force 
issuers to change their activities, but they can indicate what future activities they would view 
negatively, which could dissuade them purchasing bonds for that issue, but also in the future. 
The combination of metrics and soft power disciplines HAs and in doing so can restrict their 
activities and undermine their social aims (Emerson and Twersky 1996; Nicholls 2008): 
 
“Someone asked me the correct question quite early on in the deal about 
“What is the right level of surplus we should be making, given our social 
purpose?” and that’s a really difficult question…The types of things that the 
rating agencies and the investors are looking for are things like margin 
performance or operating surplus, operating margins, etc.  Now 
fundamentally those are all geared to be more profitable...So on the one 
hand they would like all those things to improve, but how do you get more 
profitable?  Well there’s a number of ways, one of them is you spend less 
on repairs, that’s probably the easiest one; obviously less staff.  So there 
are tensions there, but as I was saying earlier, you have almost got the 
reverse to that, which is we don’t really want you getting into anything 
other than social housing, so I know you’d like to do all that build for sale 
stuff, but that makes us a bit nervous”  (R7 housing association) 
 
Interviewees indicated how investors were not keen on complex business models which 
deviate from social housing due to the higher risk, despite the opportunities to grow returns, 
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invest in community programmes, and provide housing for key workers - meeting social 
objectives (cf. Nicholls 2008). The metrics developed by bond rating agencies and used by 
investors can also be problematic in that they do not accommodate the diverse and strategic 
activities of HAs. Interview 5 below, outlines how attempts to become more sustainable and 
efficient, which should reduce risk to investors and enhance performance, contradicts the 
standards and metrics: 
 
“…the other thing that you get with a credit rating is you can have a scenario 
where the rating actually cuts against your strategic objectives.  So for 
example, one of the objectives we’ve got, is to rationalize our stock base 
and get out of areas that are not strategically important to us anymore. But 
what the credit rating agencies do is they actually measure your activity, 
not the purpose behind it…therefore they will look at your asset disposals 
and say “Oooh, you are shedding a lot of assets.  You are getting a lot of 
money through assets disposals, therefore you are a higher risk 
organization” and “By the way, we’ve dropped your credit rating.” “(R5 
housing association) 
Organisational change, even for legitimate strategic purposes, can trigger bond market 
downgrades, which increases the cost of future bond issues, removing future cash that could 
be deployed in creating more social and affordable housing, or supporting communities. 
Subsequently, we argue that HAs are acceding to established practices of financialization, 
altering their operations to fit metrics developed by external financial intermediaries, in 
exchange for funding, as opposed to reshaping the established practices of private real-estate 
financialization. 
Recent changes to welfare payments including the ‘Bedroom Tax’, incoming Universal Credit 
and direct payments have created new potential risks to timely rent payments, reducing 
available revenue, which could trigger a bond default. Despite initial concerns by stakeholders 
in the HA sector, new innovations to reassure investors that this risk is being managed have 
been successful, limiting the difficulties for tenants struggling to pay their rent, while providing 
additional training and support:  
“…the whole welfare reform has in fact led to a beneficial impact on our 
cash flow, because we have put a lot more effort into collecting the rents.  
So we have spent quite a lot of money on automating processes, bringing 
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in things like text messaging, so the people get an automatic text…We have 
also invested in benefit advisors, so we find that quite a lot of people are 
getting more benefits than they were before because we have put the 
effort into helping them optimise their income.  We have also spent money 
on employment and training programmes, which are helping tenants get 
employment, because once you are working, the caps and everything else 
become less relevant” (R2 housing association) 
 
However, these innovations have not always been positive for tenants, and in some cases HAs 
have begun to undermine their own social objectives in providing housing for low income 
households. These associations have begun to undertake close analyses of their tenant 
portfolio, investigating what proportion of tenants are supported living, working families on 
low incomes, and the unemployed. In this sense, the operation of these organisations and the 
activities of their stakeholders have become increasingly aligned with the objectives of 
investors (Pike 2006). In order to reduce the likelihoods of future arrears and defaults, some 
organisations are actively managing new applications to reject households deemed high risk, 
moving towards practices employed in the private rental sector, with those on lower incomes 
facing the downsides of financialization’s politics (French et al. 2011):  
 
“There is evidence that there are changes both in allocations and then 
practice towards arrears in the tenancies.  So we are increasingly seeing 
housing associations not accepting nominations, as I say, the Council 
nominates a household to go into housing association property, if they’re 
on benefits the housing associations increasingly are trying to reject the 
nomination. We are seeing safeguards against bedroom tax, working 
tenants who are paying their rent in themselves, being told that they can’t 
take properties where they would be under occupying and liable for the 
bedroom tax if they did lose their job” (R16 stakeholder) 
 
The adoption of sharper commercial practices has emerged from the growth of HAs through 
mergers and diversification, making them more complex, especially in their use of financial 
markets. This has led to a transition towards a more corporate culture, focusing on finance-
led growth, returns and organisational performance, which many public sector and third 
sector organisations currently face (O’Neill 2013; Froud 2013; Engelen et al. 2014). As 
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illustrated below, the financialization’s politics have begun to demote the importance of social 
objectives in supporting local communities in some organisations: 
 
“I mean big housing associations, sadly they’ve lost their focus on the social 
bit, I would argue…I am thinking of Association X in London.  I forget the 
name of the people that did that but they seemed to have completely 
dismantled a local community by shifting them all over London and 
uprooted them, just to build some new cutting edge state of the art social 
housing and new private build next to a train station.  That will be snapped 
up by bankers” (R6 housing association) 
 
While the introduction of real estate financialization practices has enabled HAs to bridge a 
funding gap left by the withdrawal of state funding, it has also introduced new politics to the 
sector to protect investor returns as the objectives and performance metrics of the sector have 
been recoded (Beunza and Garud 2007; Engelen et al. 2010; Manville and Broad 2013). While 
accessing international capital markets has been successful for meeting finance needs, it is 
clear that the sector faces new pressures that have seen larger HAs begin to drift from their 
social objectives. Subsequently, some organisations are focussing on protecting their 
reputations in the eyes of investors through performance management metrics and standards, 
constraining their ability to create organisations that can assist local communities.   
 
5. Conclusion 
Following the GFC, there has been a marked increase of research into financialization and real-
estate. However, two important shortcomings have emerged within the literature. First, the 
financialization of the third sector and HAs (Engelen et al. 2014; Aalbers et al. 2015) have been 
overlooked. Second, scholars examining financialization in real-estate have underestimated 
the complexity of the processes that (re)shape real-estate owners such as institutional 
landlords and their activities, through bond programmes. In addressing these two research 
gaps, we argue that the politics of financialization discipline organisations involved in the 
funding and provision of housing, through capital market participation. In doing so, we have 
sought to provide deeper insight into how HAs have become deeply entwined in capital 
markets, and how they have undergone organisational change, developing new plans and 
processes to enable them to access bond markets, which have had some positive, and less 
positive, impacts on HAs and their tenants.  
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We examined how HA financing falls under the broader umbrella of third sector 
financialization, although we note that while HA bond financing participants face the same 
difficulties in reconciling politics, expectations and terminologies with investors, as do other 
social enterprises (Pache and Santis 2013), the market is more distinct and widely recognised 
by investors. Unlike social enterprises who often utilise bricolage to facilitate projects3 (Sunley 
and Pinch 2012), HAs require substantial volumes of capital to operate. It can be argued that 
HAs have a greater need to access capital market funding, and in turn reorganise to meet 
financier demands. In this sense, the sector can be used as a case to explore how social 
enterprises could face challenges to their missions and culture, if adopting wider access to 
social finance. In the paper, we uncovered how the social objectives of the third sector have 
been challenged by the power of financialization, capital market intermediaries and asset 
managers, through metrics, policies and expectations. This leads us to argue that practices of 
financialization are forcing HAs to change their organisation and strategies, rather than the 
politics of financialization, changing to accommodate HAs. As such, the paper provides new 
insight into how financialization has begun to permeate the third sector, and the processes 
through which it can do so, building upon the current literature (cf. French et al. 2011; Aalbers 
and Christophers 2014).  
In addition, our paper also draws attention to the spatial implications of HAs and 
financialization. Our study demonstrates how regional labour markets and demand for 
accommodation, tenure and land price can shape the activities of HAs, but also how local 
dynamics can shape the risk perceptions of investors, affecting the cost of social housing 
funding. As such, it can be more expensive for smaller HAs outside of London to obtain funding 
to (re)develop their housing assets. The paper also disentangles the geographies of capital 
market intermediaries and investors that constitute the market which enables the 
financialization of HAs (cf. Lennartz 2011; Folkman et al. 2007), through a mixture of London 
based high-street banks, boutique financial companies and investment banks, through to 
Edinburgh-based asset managers and increasingly North American investors, extending the 
networks of investors, who are able to discreetly influence the business plans and strategies 
of HAs, to protect their investments and to secure their returns. Interestingly, the paper 
revealed how investors have been seeking alternative real-estate investment opportunities, 
                                                          
3 Bricolage refers to the use of alternative resources and improvisation strategies to enable projects in 
the third sector. Resources could include fundraising, crowd sourcing, the use of volunteer labour, 
borrowing or requesting the donation of assets or changing expenditure behaviours to harness 
internal resources like cash flow, rather than turn to formal bank or capital market funding (see Sunley 
and Pinch 2012). 
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that offer low risk and steady returns which can replace substantially reduced securitization 
markets (Wainwright 2015; Fields 2017). 
The paper raises broader questions about the impact of financialization’s practices and its 
modification of new management techniques, metrics and knowledges (Engelen et al. 2010; 
Beunza and Garud 2007), which reshape the activities of the third sector through a more 
commercial lens, challenging the supremacy of social over economic value creation for HAs. 
While an emergent HA bond market has filled a funding gap developed by the roll-back of state 
investment, it is likely that the government would be able to raise cheaper funding for the HA 
sector by directly issuing treasury bonds. This shift to an off-balance funding approach for the 
government, facilitated through financialization processes, has created new opportunities for 
capital market intermediaries in developing individual HA bond programmes, but has 
increased funding costs, resources that could be used to support vulnerable communities, 
while more questionable practices which have emerged can have a direct negative effect on 
vulnerable households (cf. Emerson and Twersky 1996; Nicholls 2008). The outcomes for 
different stakeholders are mixed: the government has reduced its funding costs; capital 
intermediaries earn fees, while risk is transferred to asset managers and vulnerable 
households, where the former are able to absorb risk (Folkman et al. 2007), but the latter 
cannot, exposing vulnerable households to risks of eviction, waiting lists and rent increases. 
Despite these pressures, HAs have made some headway in trying to mitigate the negative 
outcomes for households. For example, they have invested in financial education, arrears 
management, job training and assisting tenants to apply for eligible benefits to make tenants 
more resilient to reduced benefits and arrears policies. 
We argue that further research is needed to explore how practices of financialization are 
reshaping the third sector, practices that are challenging the historical, social objectives of 
these organisations. While earlier studies of financialization have been applied to the private 
sector (Muellerleile 2009; Langley 2007; Pike 2006), which is more closely aligned with the 
politics of financialization, the permeation of high-finance into HAs, which prioritise social 
value creation have arguably had a substantial impact on the strategic orientation, values and 
practices of these organisations. This has required the translation of market knowledges, 
cultural change and financial performance metrics (Manville and Broad 2013; Miller and Rose 
2008; Engelen et al. 2010), which remain understudied in the third sector context. Economic 
geographers and social scientists need to turn and seriously examine the permeation of 
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financialization’s practices into the third sector, to examine the new spaces and institutions 
which it is beginning to reshape. 
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